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Abstract
In social dilemma situations, individual rational-
ity leads to sub-optimal group outcomes. Several
human engagements can be modeled as a sequen-
tial (multi-step) social dilemmas. However, in
contrast to humans, Deep Reinforcement Learn-
ing agents trained to optimize individual rewards
in sequential social dilemmas converge to self-
ish, mutually harmful behavior. We introduce
a status-quo loss (SQLoss) that encourages an
agent to stick to the status-quo, rather than repeat-
edly changing its policy. We show how agents
trained with SQLoss evolve cooperative behavior
in several social dilemma matrix games. To work
with social dilemma games that have visual input,
we propose GameDistill. GameDistill uses
self-supervision and clustering to automatically
extract cooperative and selfish policies from a so-
cial dilemma game. We combine GameDistill
and SQLoss to show how agents evolve socially
desirable cooperative behavior in the Coin Game.
1. Introduction
Consider a sequential social dilemma, where individually
rational behavior leads to outcomes that are sub-optimal for
each individual in the group. (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1999; Dietz et al., 2003). Current state-of-
the-art Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning (MARL)
methods that train agents independently can lead to agents
that fail to cooperate reliably, even in simple social dilemma
settings. This failure to cooperate results in sub-optimal
individual and group outcomes (Foerster et al. (2018); Lerer
& Peysakhovich (2017), Section 2.2).
To illustrate why it is challenging to evolve cooperation in
such dilemmas, we consider the Coin Game ((Foerster et al.,
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2018), Figure 1). Each agent can play either selfishly (pick
all coins) or cooperatively (pick only coins of its color).
Regardless of the behavior of the other agent, the individu-
ally rational choice for an agent is to play selfishly, either
to minimize losses (avoid being exploited) or to maximize
gains (exploit the other agent). However, when both agents
behave rationally, they try to pick all coins and achieve an
average long term reward of −0.5. In contrast, if both play
cooperatively, then the average long term reward for each
agent is 0.5. Therefore, when agents cooperate, they are
both better off. Training Deep RL agents independently
in the Coin Game using state-of-the-art methods leads to
mutually harmful selfish behavior (Section 2.2).
In this paper, we present a novel MARL algorithm that al-
lows independently learning Deep RL agents to converge to
individually and socially desirable cooperative behavior
in such social dilemma situations. Our key contributions
can be summarised as:
1. We introduce a Status-Quo loss (SQLoss, Sec-
tion 2.3) and an associated policy gradient-based algo-
rithm to evolve optimal behavior for agents that can act
in either a cooperative or a selfish manner, by choosing
between a cooperative and a selfish policy. We empiri-
cally demonstrate that agents trained with the SQLoss
evolve optimal behavior in several social dilemma iter-
ated matrix games (Section 4).
2. We propose GameDistill (Section 2.4), an algorithm
that reduces a social dilemma game with visual ob-
servations to an iterated matrix game by extracting
policies that implement cooperative and selfish behav-
ior. We empirically demonstrate that GameDistill
extracts cooperative and selfish policies for the Coin
Game (Section 4.2).
3. We demonstrate that when agents run GameDistill
followed by MARL game-play using SQLoss, they
converge to individually as well as socially desirable
cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game with
visual observations (Section 4.2).
The problem of how independently learning agents evolve
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Figure 1: Two agents (Red and Blue) playing the Coin
Game. The agents, along with a Blue or Red coin, appear
at random positions in a 3x3 grid. An agent observes the
complete 3x3 grid as input and can move either left, right,
up, or down. When an agent moves into a cell with a coin,
it picks the coin, and a new instance of the game begins. If
the Red agent picks the Red coin, it gets a reward of +1
and the Blue agent gets no reward. If the Red agent picks
the Blue coin, it gets a reward of +1, and the Blue agent
gets a reward of −2. The blue agent’s reward structure is
symmetric to that of the red agent.
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been studied
by researchers through human studies and simulation mod-
els (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Green & Porter, 1984;
Fudenberg et al., 1994; Kamada & Kominers, 2010; Abreu
et al., 1990). A large body of work has looked at the mech-
anism of evolution of cooperation through reciprocal be-
haviour and indirect reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod,
1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; 1993; 1998), through vari-
ants of reinforcement using aspiration (Macy & Flache,
2002), attitude (Damer & Gini, 2008) or multi-agent re-
inforcement learning (Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Wunder
et al., 2010), and under specific conditions (Banerjee & Sen,
2007) using different learning rates (de Cote et al., 2006)
similar to WoLF (WOL, 2002) as well as using embedded
emotion (Yu et al., 2015), social networks (Ohtsuki et al.,
2006; Santos & Pacheco, 2006).
However, these approaches do not directly apply to Deep
RL agents (Leibo et al., 2017). Recent work in this di-
rection (Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016; Julien et al., 2017;
Peysakhovich & Lerer, 2018) focuses on letting agents learn
strategies in multi-agent settings through interactions with
other agents. Leibo et al. (2017) define the problem of social
dilemmas in the Deep RL framework and analyze the out-
comes of a fruit-gathering game (Julien et al., 2017). They
vary the abundance of resources and the cost of conflict in
the fruit environment to generate degrees of cooperation be-
tween agents. Hughes et al. (2018) define an intrinsic reward
(inequality aversion) that attempts to reduce the difference in
obtained rewards between agents. The agents are designed
to have an aversion to both advantageous (guilt) and disad-
vantageous (unfairness) reward allocation. This handcraft-
ing of loss with mutual fairness evolves cooperation, but it
leaves the agent vulnerable to exploitation. LOLA (Foerster
et al., 2018) uses opponent awareness to achieve high levels
of cooperation in the Coin Game and the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. However, the LOLA agent assumes access
to the other agent’s policy parameters and gradients. This
level of access is analogous to getting complete access to
the other agent’s private information and therefore devising
a strategy with full knowledge of how they are going to play.
Wang et al. (2019) propose an evolutionary Deep RL setup
to evolve cooperation. They define an intrinsic reward that is
based on features generated from the agent’s past and future
rewards, and this reward is shared with other agents. They
use evolution to maximize the sum of rewards among the
agents and thus evolve cooperative behavior. However, shar-
ing rewards in this indirect way enforces cooperation rather
than evolving it through independently learning agents.
In contrast, we introduce a Status-Quo (SQLoss) that
evolves cooperation between agents without sharing re-
wards, gradients, or using a communication channel. The
SQLoss encourages an agent to imagine the consequences
of sticking to the status-quo. This imagined stickiness en-
sures that an agent gets a better estimate of a cooperative or
selfish policy. Without SQLoss, agents repeatedly switch
policies (from cooperative to selfish), obtain short-term re-
wards (through exploitation), and, therefore incorrectly learn
that a selfish strategy gives higher rewards in the long-term.
To work with social dilemma games that have visual obser-
vations, we introduce GameDistill. GameDistill uses
self-supervision and clustering to automatically extract a
cooperative and a selfish policy from a social dilemma game.
The input toGameDistill is a collection of state sequences
derived from game-play between two randomly initialized
agents. Each state sequence represents a collection of states
and actions (of both agents), leading up to a reward in the
environment. GameDistill uses this collection of state
sequences to learn two oracles. One oracle represents a
cooperative policy, and the other oracle represents a selfish
policy. Given a state, an oracle returns an action accord-
ing to the specific policy. It is important to note that each
agent independently runs GameDistill to extract oracles.
(For instance, Figure 8 (Appendix A) illustrates the coop-
eration and defection oracles extracted by the Red agent
using GameDistill in the Coin Game.) Figure 2 shows the
high-level architecture of our approach.
1. For a social dilemma game with visual observations,
each RL agent runs GameDistill to learn oracles that
implement cooperative and selfish behavior.
2. We train agents (with SQLoss) to play the game such
that at any step, an agent can either take the action sug-
gested by the cooperation oracle or the selfish oracle.
We empirically demonstrate in Section 4 that our approach
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Figure 2: High-level architecture of our approach. Each agent runs GameDistill by performing (1), (2), (3) individually
before playing the social dilemma game. This creates two oracles per agent. During game-play(4), each agent (enhanced
with SQLoss) takes either the action suggested by the cooperation oracle or the action suggested by the defection oracle.
evolves cooperative behavior between independently trained
agents.
2. Approach
2.1. Social Dilemmas modeled as Iterated Matrix
Games
We adopt the definitions in Foerster et al. (2018). We
model social dilemmas as general-sum Markov (simultane-
ous move) games. A multi-agent Markov game is specified
by G = 〈S, A, U , P , r, n, γ〉. S denotes the state space of
the game. n denotes the number of agents playing the game.
At each step of the game, each agent a ∈ A, selects an
action ua ∈ U . ~u denotes the joint action vector that repre-
sents the simultaneous actions of all agents. The joint action
~u changes the state of the game from s to s′ according to the
state transition function P (s′|~u, s) : S×U×S → [0, 1]. At
the end of each step, each agent a gets a reward according
to the reward function ra(s, ~u) : S × U→ R. The reward
obtained by an agent at each step is a function of the actions
played by all agents. For an agent, a, the discounted future
return from time t is defined as Rat =
∑∞
l=0 γ
lrat+l, where
γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. Each agent independently
attempts to maximize its expected total discounted reward.
Matrix games are the special case of two-player perfectly
observable Markov games (Foerster et al., 2018). Table 1
shows examples of matrix games that represent social dilem-
mas. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix game in
Table 1a. Each agent can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
For an agent, playing D is the rational choice, regardless of
whether the other agent plays either C or D. Therefore, if
both agents play rationally, they each receive a reward of−2.
However, if each agent plays C, then it will obtain a reward
of −1. This fact that individually rational behavior leads
to a sub-optimal group (and individual) outcome highlights
the dilemma.
In Infinitely Iterated Matrix Games, agents repeatedly play a
particular matrix game against each other. In each iteration
of the game, each agent has access to the actions played by
both agents in the previous iteration. Therefore, the state
input to an RL agent consists of the actions of both agents
in the previous iteration of the game. We adopt this state
formulation to remain consistent with Foerster et al. (2018).
The infinitely iterated variations of the matrix games in
Table 1 represent sequential social dilemmas. For ease of
representation, we refer to infinitely iterated matrix games
as iterated matrix games in subsequent sections.
2.2. Learning Policies in Iterated Matrix Games: The
Selfish Learner
The standard method to model agents in iterated matrix
games is to model each agent as a Deep RL agent that
independently attempts to maximize its expected total dis-
counted reward. Several approaches to model agents in this
way use policy gradient-based methods (Sutton et al., 2000;
Williams, 1992)). Policy gradient methods update an agent’s
policy, parameterized by θa, by performing gradient ascent
on the expected total discounted reward E[Ra0 ]. Formally,
let θa denote the parameterized version of an agent’s policy
pia and V aθ1,θ2 denote the total expected discounted reward
for agent a. Here, V a is a function of the policy parameters
(θ1, θ2) of both agents. In the ith iteration of the game, each
agent updates θai to θ
a
i+1, such that it maximizes it’s total
expected discounted reward. θai+1 is computed as follows:
θ1i+1 = argmaxθ1V
1(θ1, θ2i )
θ2i+1 = argmaxθ2V
2(θ1i , θ
2)
(1)
For agents trained using reinforcement learning, the gradient
ascent rule to update θ1i+1 is:
f1nl = ∇θi1V 1(θ1i , θ2i ) · δ
θ1i+1 = θ
1
i + f
1
nl(θ
1
i , θ
2
i )
(2)
where δ is the step size of the updates.
In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game, agents
trained with the policy gradient update method converge
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Figure 3: Intuition behind SQLearner. At each step, the
SQLoss encourages an agent to imagine the consequences
of sticking to the status-quo by imagining an episode where
the status-quo is repeated for κ steps. Section 2.3 describes
SQLoss in more detail.
to a sub-optimal mutual defection equilibrium (Figure 4,
(Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2017)). This sub-optimal equilib-
rium attained by Selfish Learners motivates us to explore
alternative methods that could lead to a desirable coopera-
tive equilibrium. We denote the agent trained using policy
gradient updates as a Selfish Learner (SL).
2.3. Learning Policies in Iterated Matrix Games: The
Status-Quo Aware Learner (SQLoss)
2.3.1. SQLoss: INTUITION
Why do independent, selfish learners converge to mutually
harmful behavior in the IPD? To understand this, consider
the payoff matrix for a single iteration of the IPD in Table 1a.
In each iteration, an agent can play either C or D. Mutual
defection (D,D) is worse for each agent than mutual co-
operation (C,C). However, one-sided exploitation (D,C)
is better than mutual cooperation for the exploiter and far
worse for the exploited. Therefore, as long as an agent
perceives the possibility of exploitation ((D,C) or (C,D)),
it is drawn to defect, both to maximize reward (through
exploitation) and minimize loss (through being exploited).
To increase the likelihood of cooperation, it is important to
reduce instances of exploitation between agents. We posit
that, if agents mostly only either mutually cooperate (C,C)
or mutually defect (D,D), then they will learn to prefer C
and achieve a socially desirable cooperative equilibrium.
Motivated by this idea, we introduce a status-quo loss
(SQLoss) for each agent derived from the idea of imag-
inary game-play, as depicted in Figure 3. Intuitively, the
loss encourages an agent to imagine an episode where the
status-quo (current situation) is repeated for a number of
steps. This imagined episode causes the exploited agent
(in (D,C)) to perceive a continued risk of exploitation and,
therefore, quickly move to (D,D). Hence, for an agent, the
short-term gain from exploitation (D,C) is overcome by
the long-term loss from mutual exploitation (D,D). There-
fore, agents move towards either mutual cooperation (C,C)
or mutual defection (D,D). With exploitation (and sub-
sequently, the fear of being exploited) out of the picture,
agents move towards mutual cooperation. Figure 3 shows
the idea behind SQLoss.
2.3.2. SQLoss: FORMULATION
We describe below the formulation of SQLoss with respect
to agent 1. The formulation for agent 2 is identical to that
of agent 1. Let τa = (s0, u10, u
2
0, r
1
0, · · · sT , u1T , u2T , r1T )
denote the collection of an agent’s experiences after T time
steps. Let R1t (τ1) denote the discounted future return for
agent 1 starting at st in actual game-play. Let τˆ1 denote
denote the collection of an agent’s imagined experiences.
For a state st (t ∈ [0, T )), an agent imagines an episode by
starting at st and repeating u1t−1, u
2
t−1 for κt steps. This
is equivalent to imagining a κt step repetition of already
played actions. We sample κt from a Discrete Uniform
distribution U{1, z} where z is a hyper-parameter ≥ 1. To
simplify notation, let φt(st, κt) denote the ordered set of
state, actions, and rewards starting at time t and repeated
κt times for imagined game-play. Let Rˆ1t (τˆ1) denote the
discounted future return starting at st in imagined status-quo
game-play.
φt(st, κt) =
[
(st, u
1
t−1, u
2
t−1, r
1
t−1)0, · · · ,
(st, u
1
t−1, u
2
t−1, r
1
t−1)κt−1
]
(3)
τˆ1 =
(
φt(st, κt), (st+1, u
1
t+1, u
2
t+1, r
1
t+1)κt+1, · · · ,
(sT , u
1
T , u
2
T , r
1
T )T+κt−t
)
(4)
R1t (τ1) =
T∑
l=t
γl−tr1l
Rˆ1t (τˆ1) =
(1− γκ
1− γ
)
r1t−1 + γ
κR1t (τ1)
=
(1− γκ
1− γ
)
r1t−1 + γ
κ
T∑
l=t
γl−tr1l
(5)
V 1θ1,θ2 and Vˆ
1
θ1,θ2 are approximated by E[R
1
0(τ1)] and
E[Rˆ10(τˆ1)] respectively. These V values are the expected
rewards conditioned on both agents’ policies (pi1, pi2). For
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agent 1, the regular gradients and the Status-Quo gradients,
∇θ1 E[R10(τ1)] and∇θ1 E[Rˆ10(τˆ1)], can be derived from the
policy gradient formulation as:
∇θ1 E[R10(τ1)] = E[R10(τ1)∇θ1 logpi1(τ1)]
= E
[ T∑
t=0
∇θ1 logpi1(u1t |st) ·
T∑
l=t
γlr1l
]
= E
[ T∑
t=0
∇θ1 logpi1(u1t |st)γt
(
R1t (τ1)− b(st)
)]
(6)
∇θ1 E[Rˆ10(τˆ1)] = E [Rˆ10(τˆ1)∇θ1 logpi1(τˆ1)]
= E
[
T∑
t=0
∇θ1 logpi1(u1t−1|st)×(
t+κ∑
l=t
γlr1t−1 +
T∑
l=t
γl+κr1l
)]
= E
[
T∑
t=0
∇θ1 logpi1(u1t−1|st)×((1− γκ
1− γ
)
γtr1t−1 + γ
κ
T∑
l=t
γlr1l
)]
= E
[ T∑
t=0
∇θ1 logpi1(u1t−1|st)γt
(
Rˆ1t (τˆ1)− b(st)
)]
(7)
where b(st) is a baseline for variance reduction.
Then the update rule fsql,pg for the policy gradient-based
Status-Quo Learner (SQL-PG) is,
f1sql,pg =
(
α · ∇θ1 E[R10(τ1)] + β · ∇θ1 E[Rˆ10(τ1)]
)
· δ (8)
where α and β denote the loss scaling factor for the reinforce
and the imaginative game-play, respectively.
2.4. GameDistill: Moving Beyond Iterated Matrix
Games
In the previous sections, we have focused on evolving co-
operative behavior in the iterated matrix game formulation
of sequential social dilemmas. In the iterated matrix game
formulation, an agent is only allowed to either cooperate or
defect in each iteration. However, in a social dilemma game
with visual observations, it is not clear what set of low-level
actions constitute cooperative or selfish behavior. There-
fore, to work on social dilemmas with visual observations,
we propose GameDistill, an approach that automatically
learns a cooperation and a defection policy by analyzing
the behavior of randomly initialized agents. GameDistill
learns these policies in the form of cooperation and defec-
tion oracles. Given a state, the cooperation oracle suggests
an action that represents cooperative behavior. Similarly, the
defection oracle suggests an action that represents selfish
behavior (Figure 8 (Appendix A)). When RL agents play
the social dilemma game, each agent independently runs
GameDistill before playing the game. Once both agents
have run GameDistill, they consult either of the two ex-
tracted oracles in every step of the game. Therefore, in each
step, an agent either takes the action recommended by the
cooperation oracle or the action recommended by the defec-
tion oracle. In this way, we reduce the visual input game to
an iterated matrix game and subsequently apply SQLoss to
evolve cooperative behavior. GameDistill (see Figure 2)
works as follows.
1. We initialize RL agents with random weights and play
them against each other in the game. In these random
game-play episodes, whenever an agent receives a re-
ward, we store the sequence of the last three states up
to the current state.
2. This collection of state sequences is used to train the
GameDistill network. The GameDistill network
takes as input a sequence of states and predicts the
rewards of both agents as well as environment parame-
ters that depend on the game. For instance, in the Coin
Game, the GameDistill network predicts the rewards
of both agents and the color of the picked coin.
3. Training the GameDistill network leads to the emer-
gence of feature embeddings for the various state se-
quences. Subsequently, clustering these embeddings
using Agglomerative Clustering (with number of clus-
ters=2) leads to the development of cooperative and
defection clusters. One of the learned clusters contains
state sequences that represent cooperative behavior,
and the other cluster contains state sequences that rep-
resent defection. For instance, in the Coin Game, a
point in the cooperation cluster contains a sequence of
states where an agent picks a coin of its color.
4. To train the cooperation and defection oracle networks,
we use the collection of state sequences in each cluster.
For each sequence of states in a cluster, we train the
oracle network to predict the next action, given the cur-
rent state. For instance, Figure 8 (Appendix A)shows
the cooperation and defection oracles extracted by the
Red agent using GameDistill in the Coin Game.
Section 3.3 describes the architectural choices of each com-
ponent of GameDistill.
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C D
C (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
D (0, -3) (-2, -2)
(a) Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)
H T
H (+1, -1) (-1, +1)
T (-1, +1) (+1, -1)
(b) Matching Pennies (MP)
C D
C (0, 0) (-4, -1)
D (-1, -4) (-3, -3)
(c) Stag Hunt (SH)
Table 1: Payoff matrices for the different games used in our experiments. (X,Y ) in a cell represents a reward of X to the
row and Y to the column player. C, D, H , and T denote the actions for the row and column players. In the iterated versions
of these games, agents play against each other over several iterations. In each iteration, an agent takes an action and receives
a reward based on the actions of both agents. Each matrix represents a different kind of social dilemma.
3. Experimental Setup
In order to compare our results to previous work (Foerster
et al., 2018), we use the Normalized Discounted Reward
(NDR = (1 − γ)∑Tt=0 γtrt). A higher NDR implies
that an agent obtains a higher reward in the environment.
We compare our approach (Status-Quo Aware Learner:
SQLearner) to Learning with Opponent-Learning Aware-
ness (Lola-PG) (Foerster et al., 2018) and the Selfish Learner
(SL, Section 2.2). For all experiments, we perform 20 runs
and report average NDR, along with variance across runs.
The bold line in all the figures is the mean, and the shaded
region is the one standard deviation region over the mean.
All of our code is available at Code (2019).
3.1. Social Dilemma Games
For our experiments with social dilemma matrix games,
we use the (Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) (Luce &
Raiffa, 1989), Iterated Matching Pennies (IMP) (Lee &
Louis, 1967), and the Iterated Stag Hunt (ISH) (Foerster
et al., 2018)). Table 1 shows the payoff matrix for a single
iteration of each game. In iterated matrix games, at each
iteration, agents take an action according to a policy and
receive the rewards in Table 1. To simulate an infinitely
iterated game, we let agents play 200 iterations of the game
against each other, and do not provide an agent with any
information about the number of remaining iterations (Foer-
ster et al., 2018). In an iteration, the state for an agent is the
actions played by both agents in the previous iteration. Each
matrix game in Table 1 represents a different dilemma.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational policy for each agent
is to defect, regardless of the policy of the other agent. How-
ever, when each agent plays rationally, each is worse off.
In Matching Pennies, if an agent plays predictably, it is
prone to exploitation by the other agent. Therefore, the opti-
mal policy is to randomize between H and T , obtaining an
average NDR of 0. The Stag Hunt game represents a coordi-
nation dilemma. In the game, given that the other agent will
cooperate, an agent’s optimal action is to cooperate as well.
However, at each step, each agent has an attractive alterna-
tive, that of defecting and obtaining a guaranteed reward
of 3. Therefore, the promise of a safer alternative and the
fear that the other agent might select the safer choice could
drive an agent to also select the safer alternative, thereby
sacrificing the higher reward of mutual cooperation.
For our experiments on a social dilemma with visual obser-
vations, we use the Coin Game (Figure 1) (Foerster et al.,
2018). The rational policy for an agent is to defect and try
to pick all coins, regardless of the policy of the other agent.
However, when both agents defect, both are worse off.
3.2. SQLoss
For our experiments with the Selfish and Status-Quo
Aware Learner (SQLearner), we use policy gradient-based
learning where we train an agent with the Actor-Critic
method (Sutton & Barto, 2011). Each agent is parame-
terized with a policy actor and critic for variance reduction
in policy updates. During training, we use gradient descent
with step size, δ = 0.005 for the actor and δ = 1 for the
critic. We use a batch size of 4000 for Lola-PG (Foerster
et al., 2018) and 200 for SQLearner for roll-outs. We use
an episode length of 200 for all iterated matrix games. We
use a discount rate (γ) of 0.96 for the Iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and Coin Game. For the It-
erated Matching Pennies, we use γ = 0.9. The high value
of γ allows for long time horizons, thereby incentivizing
long-term reward. Each agent randomly samples κ from
U ∈ (1, z) (z = 10, discussed in Appendix C) at each step.
3.3. GameDistill
GameDistill consists of two components. First, the state
sequence encoder (Step 2, Section 2.4) that takes as input
a sequence of states and outputs a feature representation.
We encode each state in the sequence using a series of
standard Convolution layers with kernel-size 3. We then
use a fully-connected layer with 100 neurons that outputs a
dense representation of the sequence of states. The color of
picked coin, agent reward, and opponent reward branches
consist of a series of dense layers with linear activation.
We use linear activation so that we can cluster the feature
vectors (embeddings) using a linear clustering algorithm,
such as Agglomerative Clustering. We obtain similar results
when we use the K-means clustering algorithm. We use the
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Figure 4: Average NDR values for different learners in the
IPD game. SQLearner agents obtain a near-optimal NDR
value (−1) for this game. In contrast to other methods,
SQLearner agents have close to zero variance across runs.
Binary-Cross-Entropy (BCE) loss for classification and the
mean-squared error (MSE) loss for regression. We use the
Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) optimizer (learning rate 0.003).
Second, the oracle network (Step 4, Section 2.4), that pre-
dicts an action for an input state. We encode the input state
using 2 convolution layers with kernel-size 3 and relu ac-
tivation. To predict the action, we use 3 fully-connected
layers with relu activation and the BCE loss. We use L2 reg-
ularization, and Gradient Descent with the Adam optimizer
(learning rate 0.001).
4. Results
4.1. Learning optimal policies in Iterated Matrix
Games using SQLoss
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD): We train different
learners to play the IPD game. Figure 4 shows the results.
For all learners, agents initially defect and move towards
an NDR of −2.0. This initial bias towards defection is ex-
pected, since, for agents trained with random game-play
episodes, the benefits of exploitation outweigh the costs
of mutual defection. For Selfish Learner (SL) agents, the
bias intensifies, and the agents converge to mutually harm-
ful selfish behavior (NDR=−2.0). Lola-PG agents learn
to predict each other’s behavior and therefore realize that
defection is more likely to lead to mutual harm than selfish
benefit. They subsequently move towards cooperation, but
occasionally defect (NDR=−1.2). In contrast, SQLearner
agents quickly realize the costs of defection, indicated by
the small initial dip in the NDR curves. They subsequently
move towards almost perfect cooperation, with an NDR
of −1.0. Finally, it is important to note that SQLearner
agents have close to zero variance, unlike other methods
where the variance in NDR across runs is significant.
Figure 5: Average NDR values for different learners in
the IMP game. SQLearner agents avoid exploitation by
randomising between H and T to obtain a near-optimal
NDR value (0) for this game. In contrast to other methods,
SQLearner agents have close to zero variance across runs.
Iterated Matching Pennies (IMP): We train different
learners to play the IMP game. The optimal policy for
an agent to avoid exploitation is to play H or T perfectly
randomly and obtain an NDR of 0. Figure 5 shows the re-
sults. SQLearner agents learn to play optimally and obtain
an NDR close to 0. Interestingly, Selfish Learner and Lola-
PG agents converge to an exploiter-exploited equilibrium
where one agent consistently exploits the other agent. This
asymmetric exploitation equilibrium is more pronounced for
Selfish Learner agents than for Lola-PG agents. As before,
we observe that SQLearner agents have close to zero vari-
ance across runs, unlike other methods where the variance
in NDR across runs is significant.
Appendix B shows the results for the ISH game.
4.2. Evolving Cooperation in Games with visual input
using GameDistill followed by SQLoss
4.2.1. THE COIN GAME: GAMEDISTILL
To evaluate the clustering step in GameDistill, we make
two t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008) plots of the 100-
dimensional feature vector extracted from the last layer of
the GameDistill network. The first plot colors each point
(state sequence) by the rewards obtained by both agents in
the sequence. The second plot colors each point by the clus-
ter label output by Agglomerative clustering. Figure 6 shows
the results. GameDistill correctly learns two clusters, one
for state sequences that represent cooperation and the other
for state sequences that represent defection. We also exper-
iment with different values for feature vector dimensions
and obtain similar clustering results with sufficient training.
Once we have the clusters, we train oracle networks using
the state sequences in each cluster. To evaluate that the
trained oracles represent a cooperation and a defection pol-
icy, we modify the Coin Game environment to contain only
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Figure 6: Representation of the clusters learned by
GameDistill. Each point is a t-SNE projection of the
100-dimensional feature vector output by the GameDistill
network for an input sequence of states. The figure on
the left is colored based on actual rewards obtained by
each agent (Red agent followed by Blue agent). The fig-
ure on the right is colored based on clusters learned by
GameDistill. GameDistill correctly identifies two types
of state sequences, one for cooperation (blue cluster) and
the other for defection (red cluster).
the Red agent. We then play two variations of the game. In
the first variation, the Red agent is forced to play the action
suggested by the first oracle. In this variation, we find that
the Red agent picks only 8.4% of Blue coins, indicating a
high rate of cooperation. Therefore, the first oracle repre-
sents a cooperation policy. In the second variation, the Red
agent is forced to play the action suggested by the second
oracle. In this case, we find that the Red agent picks 99.4%
of Blue coins, indicating a high rate of defection. Hence,
the second oracle represents a defection policy. Therefore,
the oracles learned by the Red agent using GameDistill
represent cooperation and defection policies.
4.2.2. THE COIN GAME: SQLOSS
Before playing the game, each SQLearner agent uses
GameDistill to learn cooperation and defection oracles.
During game-play, at each step, an agent follows either the
action suggested by its cooperation oracle or the action sug-
gested by its defection oracle. Further, each SQLearner
agent has an additional SQLoss term. We compare ap-
proaches using the degree of cooperation between agents,
measured by the probability of an agent to pick the coin
of its color (Foerster et al., 2018). Figure 7 shows the re-
sults. The probability that an SQLearner agent will pick
the coin of its color is close to 1. This high probability indi-
cates that the other SQLearner agent is cooperating with
this agent and only picking coins of its color. In contrast,
the probability that a Lola-PG agent will pick its own coin
is much smaller, indicating higher rates of defection. As
expected, the probability of an agent picking its own coin is
Figure 7: Probability of an agent picking a coin of its
color for learners trained in the Coin Game. SQLearner
agents cooperate (pick only their own coins) to achieve a
near optimal strategy in the game. In contrast to Lola-PG,
SQLearner agents have close to zero variance across runs.
the smallest for selfish learners (SL). The probability value
of 0.5 indicates that a selfish learner is just as likely to pick
the other agent’s coin as it is to pick its own coin.
4.3. SQLearner: Exploitability and Adaptability
Given that an agent does not have any prior information
about the other agent, it is important that it evolves its strat-
egy based on the strategy of its opponent. To evaluate an
SQLearner agent’s ability to avoid exploitation by a self-
ish agent, we train one SQLearner agent against an agent
that always defects in the Coin Game. We find that the
SQLearner agent also learns to always defect. This persis-
tent defection is important since given that the other agent is
selfish, the SQLearner agent can do no better than also be
selfish. To evaluate an SQLearner agent’s ability to exploit
a cooperative agent, we train one SQLearner agent with
an agent that always cooperates in the Coin Game. In this
case, we find that the SQLearner agent learns to always
defect. This persistent defection is important since given
that the other agent is cooperative, the SQLearner agent
obtains maximum reward by behaving selfishly. Hence, the
SQLearner agent is both resistant to exploitation and able
to exploit, depending on the strategy of the other agent.
5. Conclusion
We have described a status-quo loss (SQLoss) that en-
courages an agent to imagine the consequences of stick-
ing to the status-quo. We demonstrated how agents trained
with SQLoss evolve cooperative behavior in several social
dilemmas without sharing rewards, gradients, or using a
communication channel. To work with visual input games,
we proposed GameDistill, an approach that automatically
extracts a cooperative and a selfish policy from a social
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dilemma game. We combined GameDistill and SQLoss
to demonstrate how agents evolve desirable cooperative be-
havior in a social dilemma game with visual observations.
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Supplementary Material
A. Illustrations of Trained Oracle Networks
for the Coin Game
+1/-2
0/0
Action predicted by 
the Cooperation
Oracle
Action predicted by 
the Defection
Oracle
Figure 8: Illustrative predictions of the oracle networks
learned by the Red agent using GameDistill in the Coin
Game. The cooperation oracle suggests an action that avoids
picking the coin of the other agent. The defection oracle
suggests an action that involves picking the coin of the other
agent.
Figure 8 shows the predictions of the oracle networks
learned by the Red agent using GameDistill in the Coin
Game. We see that the cooperation oracle suggests an ac-
tion that avoids picking the coin of the other agent (the Blue
coin). Analogously, the defection oracle suggests a selfish
action that picks the coin of the other agent.
B. Results for the Iterated Stag Hunt using
SQLoss
Figure 9 shows the results of training two SQLearner
agents on the Iterated Stag Hunt game. SQLearner agents
coordinate successfully to obtain a near-optimal NDR value
(0) for this game.
Figure 9: NDR values for SQLearner agents in the ISH
game. SQLearner agents coordinate successfully to obtain
a near optimal NDR value (0) for this game.
C. SQLoss: Effect of z on convergence to
cooperation
We explore the effect of the hyper-parameter z (Section 2)
on convergence to cooperation. To imagine the conse-
quences of maintaining the status-quo, each agent samples
κt from the Discrete Uniform distribution U{1, z}. There-
fore, a larger value of z implies a larger value of κt and
longer imaginary episodes. We find that larger z (and hence
κ) leads to faster cooperation between agents in the IPD and
Coin Game. This effect plateaus at z = 10, which we select
for our experiments.
D. Architecture Details
We performed all our experiments on an AWS instance with
the following specifications.
• Model name: Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8275CL CPU
@ 3.00GHz
• RAM: 189GB
• CPU(s): 96
• Architecture: x86 64
• Thread(s) per core: 2
E. Reproducibility Checklist
We follow the reproducibility checklist from (Pineau, 2019)
and include further details here. For all the models and
algorithms we have included details that we think would be
useful for reproducing the results of this work.
• For all models and algorithms presented, check if you
include:
1. A clear description of the mathematical setting,
algorithm, and/or model: Yes. The algorithm is
described in detail in Section 2, with all the loss
functions used for training being clearly defined.
The details of the architecture, hyperparameters
used and other algorithm details are given in Sec-
tion 3. Environment details are explained in the
sections that they are introduced in.
2. An analysis of the complexity (time, space, sample
size) of any algorithm: No. We do not include
a formal complexity analysis of our algorithm.
However, we do highlight the additional compu-
tational steps (in terms of losses and parameter
updates) in Section 2 over standard multi-agent
independently learning RL algorithms that would
be needed in our approach.
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3. A link to a downloadable source code, with spec-
ification of all dependencies, including external
libraries.: Yes. We have made the source code
available at Code (2019).
• For any theoretical claim, check if you include:
1. A statement of the result: NA. Our paper is pri-
marily empirical and we do not have any major
theoretical claims. Hence this is Not Applicable.
2. A clear explanation of any assumptions: NA.
3. A complete proof of the claim: NA.
• For all figures and tables that present empirical results,
check if you include:
1. A complete description of the data collection pro-
cess, including sample size: NA. We did not col-
lect any data for our work.
2. A link to a downloadable version of the dataset
or simulation environment: Yes. We have made
the source code available at Code (2019).
3. An explanation of any data that were excluded,
description of any pre-processing step: NA. We
did not perform any pre-processing step.
4. An explanation of how samples were allocated
for training / validation / testing: Yes. For
GameDistill the details regarding data used
for training is given in Section 2.4. The num-
ber of iterations used for learning (training) by
SQLearner is given in Figures 4, 5 and 7. The
details of the number of runs and the batch sizes
used for various experiments are given in Sec-
tion 3.
5. The range of hyper-parameters considered,
method to select the best hyper-parameter config-
uration, and specification of all hyper-parameters
used to generate results: Yes. We did not do any
hyperparameter tuning as part of this work. All
the hyperparameters that we used are specified in
Section 3.
6. The exact number of evaluation runs: Yes. For all
our environments, we repeat the experiment 20
times. For evaluation of performance, we use an
average of 200 Monte Carlo estimates. We state
this in Section 3. We do not fix any seeds. The
details of the number of runs and the batch sizes
used for various experiments are also given here.
7. A description of how experiments were run: Yes.
The README with instructions on how to run
the experiments along with the source code is
provided at Code (2019).
8. A clear definition of the specific measure or statis-
tics used to report results: Yes. We plot the mean
and the one standard deviation region over the
mean for all our numerical experiments. This is
stated in Section 3.
9. Clearly defined error bars: Yes. We plot the mean
and the one standard deviation region over the
mean for all our numerical experiments. This is
stated in Section 3.
10. A description of results with central tendency (e.g.
mean) & variation (e.g. stddev): Yes. We plot the
mean and the one standard deviation region over
the mean for all our numerical experiments. This
is stated in Section 3.
11. A description of the computing infrastructure
used: Yes. We have provided this detail in the
Supplementary material in Section D.
